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PUBLIC UTILITIES-RATE BASE-THE AFTERMATH
OF THE HOPE CASE (I)*
Historical Development of the Rate Base
The stage was set for state regulation of public utility rates in
Munn v. Illinois when the Supreme Court of the United States, speak-
ing through Mr. Chief Justice Waite, held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not prohibit state regulation of public utilities, since they
were businesses "affected with a public interest." However, the Court
failed to point out the limits of the state power to regulate rates.
2
It was not until the 1890's that the Supreme Court held that the rates
fixed by state commissions or legislatures could be overthrown if, on
appeal to the courts, they were found to be confiscatory rather than
reasonable.3 Thus, the judiciary was established as the final authority
on the question of whether the rates fixed by state authorities were
reasonable.
Rates fixed by the state, in order to be reasonable under the above
rule, must yield a fair return on the value of the property devoted to
public service at the time of the determination of the rates.4 The exact
method of determining the value of the utility's property has been the
subject of much litigation since Smyth v. Ames5 was decided in 1898.
It is the purpose of this note to make a survey of some of the more
important aspects of this litigation, especially with regard to federal
decisions since 1944.6
A judicial guide as to what constitutes a reasonable rate was set
out in Smyth v. Ames.7 The Supreme Court held that the utility was
entitled to a fair return on the fair value of its property devoted to
public service. Exactly what constituted the fair value of the utility's
property was to be determined by considering the cost of reproducing
the property at the time of valuation as compared with the original
* This note, treating the rate base problem from a federal and Supreme Court
perspective, is Part I of a two-part survey. Part I, to be published in the Spring
issue of the Kentucky Law Journal, will be primarily concerned with the rate base
problem as it is presented to Kentucky courts.
194 U.S. 113 (1876).
2 Id. at 134, where it is said, "We know that this is a power which may be
abused; but that is no argument against. . ."
8 Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 184 U.S. 418 (1890);
Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 862 (1894).
443 Am. Jur. 643 (1942).
5 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
6 This year marked the decision of Federal Power Commission v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 820 U.S. 591 (1944).
7 Supra note 5 at 546.
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cost s of the property.9 Thus, the Court clearly pointed out that repro-
duction new10 was one of the elements to be given consideration in
the determination of the rate base.
In 1903, the original cost was expressly rejected as the sole method
of valuation and reproduction new received even stronger recognition
as a positive factor in the determination of the rate base when the
Supreme Court said,"
The main object of the attack is the valuation of the plant. It no
longer is open to dispute that under the Constitution 'what the com-
pany is entitled to demand, in order that it may have just compensa-
tion, is a fair return upon the reasonable value of the property at the
time it is being used for the public.' That is decided, and is decided
as against the contention that you are to take the actual cost of the
plant, annual depreciation, etc., and to allow a fair profit on that
footing over and above expenses ...
World War I ushered in a period of rapidly rising prices which
was to last until the depression of 1929.12 During this period the
theories of reproduction cost and original cost were sharply dis-
tinguished. The utility companies were constantly advocating repro-
duction new as the most important or sole factor in determining the
value of their property because this would give the utility a larger
rate base, since the difference between original cost and reproduction
new is much greater during a period of ascending values. On the
other hand, commissions, in safeguarding the public interest, were
urging that original cost be given primary weight since, in an in-
flationary period, original cost is more favorable to the consumer.' 3
Although the reproduction new theory was approved during this
period,14 apparent dissatisfaction of a minority of the Supreme Court
with the reproduction new test was clearly seen in 1923. Mr. Justice
Brandeis in the celebrated case of Southwestern Bell Telegraph Co. v.
Public Service Commission,'5 although concurring with the result
reached by the majority, expressed disapproval of reproduction new
in the following language: "The thing devoted by the investor to the
public use is not specific property, tangible and intangible, but capital
8 Barnes, The Economics of Public Utility Regulation 406-7 (1947). Original
cost may be defined as the actual money cost of the existing property at the time
when the property was first applied to public service.
9 Smyth v. Ames, supra note 5 at 547.
10 Barnes, supra note 8 at 420. Reproduction cost is the cost to reconstruct an
identical or substantially similar plant under present conditions and prices.
11 San Diego Land and Town Company v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439 at 442 (1903).
'2 Barnes, supra note 8 at 382-3.
13 Bauer and Gold, Public Utility Valuation 19 (1934).
14 ibid.
15 262 U.S. 276 at 289 (1923). Justice Holmes joined with Justice Brandeis
in his concurring opinion.
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embarked in the enterprize." 1 He pointed out that reproduction new
was in effect a product of the times since, in 1898, when Smyth v.
Ames was decided, there was no accurate way of showing the actual
cost of establishing the utility because there were no definite or formal
accounting requirements. But as a result of the uniform system of
accounts and the commission's control of stock issuance, which had
come into common use by 1923, the amount expended was easily
ascertainable.17 It was therefore feasible by that time to adopt as the
rate base the annual cost or charge of the capital prudently invested'
in the utility.19
Some of the weaknessess 20 in the reproduction new theory were
thus seen more clearly as the result of the kind of reasoning exhibited
by Justice Brandeis. By 1942, the Supreme Court was suggesting
that the end result was the important factor to be considered when a
rate base determination was subjected to judicial review, and that a
rate-fixing group could constitutionally fix rates without being bound
by any particular formula. 21 In 1944, these suggestions became "law"
when the Court in Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas
Co.22 held that if the rates fixed by the commission permitted the com-
pany "to operate successfully, to attract capital, and to compensate its
investors," then such rates were to be deemed just and reasonable,
and the method of arriving at such rates was not to be the subject of
review by the Court. Although reproduction new was rejected as the
sole method of property valuation, the Court did not dictate any other
particular method of valuation, leaving the particular commission free
to value the property as it saw fit. The end result or "reasonableness"
of the rates fixed was thus made paramount and not the method by
which the rate base was determined.
1" Id. at 290.
17 Id. at 309.
18 Barnes, supra note 8 at 406. Prudent investment and original cost are some-
times thought to be synonomous, but there is a distinction between the two. "Pru-
dent investment differs from original cost in that it imports an element of judgment,
involving the elimination from the total of original cost of those expenditures
which were improper, improvident, or unnecessary in the light of the conditions
prevailing when the expenditures were made."
19 Southwestern Bell Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra note
15 at 310.
20 For a criticism of reproduction new see, Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v.
Ames Still Walk?' 55 Harv. L. R. 1116 (1942).21 Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575
(1942). See also 42 Columbia L.R. 870 (1942).
22320 U.S. 591 (1944).
KENTrUCKY LAW JoURNAL[Vl46
Apparent Confusion as to Whether Some Method Must Be Used
The attempt of the Court to give effect to a more sound and more
intelligent rate base regulation by the adoption of the end result test
was commendable. However, decisions subsequent to the Hope case
are illustrative of confusion in federal courts as to whether the com-
mission must still use some method or formula in determining the rate
base. The Supreme Court in Colorado-Wyoming v. Federal Power
Commission23 rejected the order of the commission since it could not
determine from the findings the method used. However, in Panhandle
Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commission24 it was stated
that the result of the commission's order was all important rather than
the choice of a formula or the propriety of the method employed by it
in reaching its conclusion. If, in the latter case, the Court means to
imply that the commission must use some formula or method in its
determination of the rate base, the two cases are in accord. If other-
wise, the cases are in direct conflict.
The decisions in the lower federal courts are in a state of. confusion
as to whether the use of a method is required. In Mississippi River
Fuel Corp. v. Federal Power Commission2 5 the utility contended that
the court was limited to reviewing only the end result of the com-
mission's rate order. In rejecting this contention the court said,
The discretion and judgment confided in the commission must be
exercised upon facts and for reason. The duty of review imposed
upon the courts require that the facts be found and the reasons
stated. Otherwise, the courts cannot determine whether a given
action is or is not arbitrary.
26
Similarly, in State Corp. Commission of Kansas v. Federal Power
Commission" the court, in rejecting the order of the commission, said
that the reasonableness of the end result could not be determined
since the court knew only the rate of return but not the findings and
reasoning of the commission. In pointing out the need for accurate
and clear findings the court in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker 8
said,
We think the commission should keep in mind its obligation to
facilitate judicial review of its orders and should assemble a record
and make findings which cover all the relevant issues. Unless the
commission tells us what farmula or formulae it has chosen and makes
clear the evidentiary support for its findings under whatever formula
adopted, we are handicapped in applying even the limited judicial
review left us by the Hope case.
23 324 U.S. 626 (1946).
24824 U.S. 635 (1945).
25 163 F. 2d 438 (CCA D.C. 1947).
26 Id. at 439.
27 206 F. 2d 690 (CCA8 1958).
28 188 F. 2d 11 at 23 (GCA D.C. 1950).
[Vol. 46,
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On the other hand in Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Commission2 9 it was said that the fact that some particular item in the
rate base appeared to be too low was immaterial since "it is not theory
but the impact of the rate order which counts. .. ." Likewise another
court has held that the commission is not required to annotate to each
finding the evidence supporting it or point out the economic factors
considered.30
These last-mentioned decisions clearly illustrate the vagueness of
the end result test, and the courts, with regard to the requirements
of the test, are in a state of confusion. Some courts require the use
of a formula in order to enhance judicial review while others accept
rather loose findings of commissions. Some indication as to the
methods employed by the commission is definitely needed. When
courts do not require commissions to point out the methods used in
rate determination "review becomes a costly, time-consuming pageant
of no practical value to anyone."3'
The Trend Toward Exclusive Use of Original Cost
Cases since the Hope decision seem to indicate that the federal
courts are now moving toward the approval of original cost as the sole
method of utility property valuation. However, the Supreme Court in
Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California
32 up-
held a rate apparently determined by the so-called "fair value" of the
utility's property. The commission used as a rate base the price at
which the property had been offered for sale to the city whereas the
original cost of the property was greatly in excess of this price. The
company contended that the order was confiscatory under the tests of
the Hope case, which would entitle it to a return sufficient to maintain
its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors.
However, the Court denied the claim of confiscation and upheld the
rate base adopted by the commission saying that the considerations
advanced in the Hope case were inapplicable to a company whose
financial integrity was hopelessly undermined. However, an apparent
explanation for the Court's approval of the "fair value" method rather
than original cost is the impaired financial condition of the utility.
Had the financial integrity of the utility not been so undermined the
commission would undoubtedly have used original cost as the rate
29156 F. 2d 949 (CCA5 1946).
30 Public Utility Commission of Conn. v. Federal Power Commission, 205 F.
2d 116 (CCAS 1953).
31 See Mr. justice Jackson's dissent in the Hope Case, supra note 22 at 645.
32324 U.S. 548 (1945).
1958]
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base. As the Court pointed out, "the due process clause.., has not and
cannot be applied to insure values or to restore values that have been
lost by the operation of economic forces."3
3
In Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commis-
sion'34 petitioner contended that if its leaseholds were to be included
in the rate base they should be included not at cost but at their cur-
rent market value. However, the Court resorted to the end result test
saying that the commission was not bound to use any single formula
for fixing rates and could therefore use actual legitimate cost. A
similar result was reached in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Commission.35
In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission36 the com-
mission rejected certain evidence tending to show the "fair value" of
certain leaseholds. The circuit court on appeal said that fair value was
no longer an essential ingredient of the rate base and that the court
has no right to intervene unless it is conclusively shown that failure
to give weight to the fair value of property will prevent the utility
from operating successfully.
It was the contention of the utility in Pichotta v. City of Skagway"
that the rate base should be measured by the capital invested by the
last purchaser. The court overruled this contention saying that original
cost, as defined by the Federal Power Commission, was "the cost of
the property to the person who first devotes it to the public service,
regardless of the number of times the utility has changed hands."38
The court pointed out that this was a necessary rule in order to avoid
conversion of original cost into "fair value." And when the utility
sought to have included in the rate base money expended by the Army
in rehabilitating petitioner's plant, the court refused saying that original
cost did not embrace a gratuitous contribution to capital made at the
taxpayer's expense.
A recent federal case has apparently held that original cost is
mandatory rather than directory. In City of Detroit v. Federal Power
Commission39 the commission, in allowing a rate increase, computed
a "field price" for the gas obtained from the utility's producing prop-
erty, which constituted slightly more than twenty-two percent of its
total gas supply. The remainder of its gas supply was computed on
33 Id. at 567.
3 4 Supra note 24.
35324 U.S. 581 (1945).
36 155 F. 2d 694 (CCA10 1946).
3778 F. Supp. 999 (D. Alaska 1948).
38 Id. at 1005.




an original cost basis. This "field price" was based upon the "weighted
average arm's length prices" established by unregulated bargaining
for similar gas in the fields. The commission then multiplied the vol-
ume of production by that "field price" and included the result in
operating expenses as an amount to be recovered through the rates.
At the same time the commission excluded from the rate base the cost
of the properties which produced this gas and excluded from recover-
able operating expenses the cost of producing it. The commission
said that its purpose was to allow the utility to receive for its own
produced gas "a price reflecting the weighted average arm's length
payments for identical natural gas in the fields where it is produced,"
instead of a return on its legitimate investment in the properties and
equipment used in producing this gas. This method allowed $3,571,448
more than would have been allowed under the original cost method.
In reversing the commission's order the court said that the commis-
sion must guard the consumers against excessive rates and to do so
any method which would award an increase must be compared with
the conventional rate base method.40 By remanding the order for com-
parison of the "field price" with original cost, the circuit court ap-
parently has once again shackled the commission to rigid adherence
to a specific rate base formula-original cost.
It thus seems that the lower federal courts show a decided tendency
toward the approval of original cost as the specific rate base formula.
At least one circuit court, in requiring the use of original cost, has
apparently contravened the intended result of the Hope case, which
was to allow flexibility in the determination of public utility rates and
to utilize administrative experience by allowing the particular com-
mission to adopt the rate base method it deems most desirable and
most suitable to the needs of a particular case. Whether or not the
Supreme Court would now consider original cost mandatory in the
determination of utility rates remains to be seen. It is to be hoped that
it would not.
Glenn L. Greene, Jr.
40 When the court uses the phrase "conventional rate base method", the court
is referring to the original cost method.
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